Can Public-Sector ICT Prove What Was Approved, Built and Actually Deployed?
How public-sector ICT can prove what was approved, accepted and actually deployed without creating another central evidence warehouse or compliance document.
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How public-sector ICT can prove what was approved, accepted and actually deployed without creating another central evidence warehouse or compliance document.
A practical way to assess data sovereignty through identity, keys, control planes, logs, backups, supply chains, portability, recovery and tested provider exit.
CVD and bug bounty cannot replace a secure SDLC. Use threat modelling, secure defaults, code and dependency controls, release gates and finding feedback.
A practical model for degraded digital-service operation: minimum service, dependency failure, manual fallback, reconciliation and controlled return to normal.